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 International Trade, Factor-Market Distortions,
 and the Optimal Dynamic Subsidy: Reply
 By HARVEY E. LAPAN*
 James Cassing and Jack Ochs' comment
 is, I believe, a very interesting extension of
 the analysis of my paper. Their two basic
 results are: (i) that congestion will occur in
 the search for jobs; and (ii) that given costly
 labor mobility, private decisions regarding
 voluntary quits will yield a socially optimal
 adjustment path if individuals have perfect
 foresight and if there is no congestion (ex-
 ternality) in the search process. Thus, they
 argue that even if factor prices are not rigid,
 the presence of congestion in the search
 process implies private decisions will not be
 socially optimal, and therefore that a sub-
 sidy will be needed to support the optimal
 plan.
 While I agree with the conclusions of the
 Cassing-Ochs paper, I disagree with the
 proof they present. In deriving the socially
 optimal plan, the authors state the objective
 is to choose R*(t) (the number of workers
 searching for jobs) ". . . to maximize na-
 tional income ... over the planning horizon"
 (p. 952), yet the objective function chosen
 (equation (3)) reflects only wage income,
 and not national income. If maximization
 of national income is the objective, then I
 believe the objective function should be:
 N
 (1) max L [P'X1(LI(t)) + PX2(L2(t))]
 t = I
 where the notation is the same as in their
 paper. Optimizing (1), subject to their equa-
 tions (6)-(8) (and the definitional equations
 (4)-(5)), the optimality condition reduces to
 (15), as presented in their paper. However,
 if their objective function is used ((3) or
 (13)), the optimality condition will not, I
 believe, reduce to (15); the reason for this
 is that, in differentiating (13) with respect
 to RN-,, Cassing-Ochs (implicitly) treat
 WJ(N - T) and W2(N - T + 1) as constants.
 But, an increase in RN-, reduces LI (N - T),
 and increases L2(N - T + 1), which, from
 their (4) and (5), implies that WI(N - T)
 and W2(N - T + 1) change as RN-,changes.
 If the objective is maximization of wage in-
 come (as implied by their choice of objective
 function), then terms reflecting the changes
 in the wage rate due to changes in the con-
 trol should appear in their objective func-
 tion. Consequently, I believe that the cri-
 terion they present for an optimal path (15)
 is inconsistent with the objective function
 ((3) or (13)) that they use. On the other
 hand, if the objective is maximization of na-
 tional income, as depicted by my (1), then I
 believe (15) reflects the appropriate opti-
 mality conditions. Nevertheless, I should
 stress that I do agree with their qualitative
 conclusion that congestion in the labor
 market will lead private decisions to be
 socially inefficient.
 Furthermore, the model presented in my
 paper can readily be interpreted to consider
 the social optimality of private actions; the
 control model in no way assumes factor
 prices are rigid. The key assumption is
 (2) LC = 0k(u)Lm; ((O) = 0,
 of > 0,I < 0
 where LC is the increase in employment in
 C (the sector in which labor's marginal
 value product is larger); Lm is the stock of
 potential workers in M (LC + Lm = L, con-
 stant), and u is the unemployment rate in M.
 While the discussion of the optimal sub-
 sidy in my paper presumes unemployment
 is involuntary, nothing precludes us from
 interpreting u as voluntary unemployment
 (this distinction is irrelevant for a centrally
 controlled solution). In terms of the Cassing-
 Ochs paper:
 (3) R (t) = uLm
 where R is voluntary unemployment. Thus,
 *Associate professor of economics, Iowa State Uni-
 versity.
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 (2) depicts the relationship between job
 hires in C and the number searching for em-
 ployment there (R(t)). Moreover:
 (4) (dL /dR) = X'(u)
 since Lm(t) is given at t. Therefore, 0'(u)dt
 represents the probability that an individual
 searching for work for a time (dt) will find
 employment in C; it corresponds to (1 -
 F(R)) in the Cassing-Ochs paper. The as-
 sumption that 0'(0) is finite merely implies
 that, if there is only one searcher, it takes a
 nonzero amount of time for him (her) to
 find a job a not unreasonable assump-
 tion.' From (4):
 (5) (d2L / dR2) = [&'(u)/Lm] < 0
 Since (5) reflects the change in the prob-
 ability of finding a job as the number of
 people searching increases, " 0 cor-
 responds to no congestion (F'(R) = 0),
 whereas 0"(u) < 0 corresponds to conges-
 tion in the labor market (F'(R) > 0).
 Private individuals, in deciding whether
 to quit work and search, compare the op-
 portunity cost of search to the expected
 benefits. Letting V(t) represent expected
 (private) net benefits of search:2
 (6) V(t) = [ '(u) fT ( W, (d)
 - Wm (6))e- r( -t) dO - Wm (t)] dt
 In (6) Wm(t)dt is the opportunity cost of
 searching for a time interval dt, 0'(u)dt is
 the probability of finding a higher paying
 job, and the integral represents the net dis-
 counted value of the higher wage rate.3 Of
 course, T reflects the end of the horizon for
 the prospective searcher. If V(t) is positive
 at u = 0, some search is worthwhile; other-
 wise, none will be undertaken.
 The socially optimal plan is given in my
 earlier paper; from the maximum principle
 (my ( 1)):
 (7) q&'(u) - PF (Nm) ? 0;
 u[q0'(u) - PF'] = 0; Nm Lm(1 - u)
 where q the costate variable is the (cur-
 rent) social value of an increase in Lj(t).
 The differential equation for q is (my (16)):
 (8) q = (r + 4)q - (Fc - P(1 - u)F ) =
 (r + X - u ')q - (Fc - PFm)
 Consider the term (4 - uo'); along an
 optimal path, u*(t) is given. Define
 (9) (t) u*)- (u
 Given that &" < 0, k(O) = 0, and 0'(0) is
 finite, then e(t) > 0 everywhere. Moreover,
 (t) 0 if either (i) 4" 0, or (ii) u*(t)
 O for all t. Thus:
 (10) (t) > 0
 if, and only if, 0" < 0 and u*(t) > 0
 Integrating (8), using (9) and the trans-
 versality condition q(T) = 0 yields
 (1 1) q(t) = ft [er(t)e -A?dA
 (F'(0) - PF' (0))] da
 In (1 1), r is constant, but e is understood to
 depend on time (if 0" < 0 and u*(t) > 0).
 Given q(t), u*(t), the optimal unemploy-
 ment rate at t, is determined from (7).
 In order to compare the socially optimal
 plan to atomistic decisions, we must specify
 how Wc and Wm are determined. If these
 parameters do not reflect the current mar-
 ginal value product of employed workers,
 I The assumption that labor mobility is costless
 means, in our context, that ?'(u) is infinite.
 2Formally, the decision is not only whether to search
 for a job, but when. Define V(t) = V(t)ert, so that
 V(t) is the discounted value of search at t. If 0 <
 V(t) < V(t + dt), then search at t is not desirable,
 even though it will eventually become so; i.e., u(t) = 0,
 but U(T) > 0, someT > t. However, for '" < 0, r > 0,
 and V(t + dt) > 0, it is readily shown that u(t) = 0 im-
 plies V(t) > V(t + dt). Consequently, not all search
 will be postponed: U((T) > 0 u(t) > 0 for all t < T.
 Similarly, if employment never falls to zero in M (as is
 guaranteed by the Inada derivative conditions), then
 a competitive solution with perfect foresight implies
 V(t) < 0. Therefore, for a competitive solution,
 u(t) > 0 implies V(t) = 0; and u(t) = 0 implies
 V(T) < 0 for all T > t. Throughout, we assume in-
 dividuals are risk neutral.
 3The integral should run from (t + dt) to T, but for
 small dt, the difference is of the second order of small-
 ness ((dt)2). Note that our formulation of the problem
 permits discounting, whereas Cassing-Ochs consider
 only the case where the private and social discount
 rates are zero.
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 it is clear private actions will not be opti-
 mal. Thus, assume
 (12) WC(t) = Fc(Lc(t)); W!(t) =
 PF' (Nm (t))
 where C is the numeraire. Using (12) and
 (I1), (7) becomes:
 (7 ) 0 (u) ft [e-r(O-t) e- J't dX
 - ( Wc ()- Wm(6))dOI - Wm(t) < 0
 Comparing (7') to (6), the private de-
 cision rule, we see that the expressions differ
 only in the term involving e; if e(t) 0, the
 two expressions coincide, assuming in-
 dividuals have perfect foresight. If there is
 no congestion (e" 0 E(t)), then private
 decisions are socially optimal. Moreover, in
 my earlier paper I showed that for 0" - 0,
 Nm(t) increases over time (for u(t) > 0).
 This implies that all separations occur
 initially. As time passes, some individuals
 find jobs in C, whereas others return to
 their "original" jobs in M.4 The pool of
 searching workers declines over time (this is
 also true for 0" < 0).
 If " < 0, but u*(t) 0 (i.e., if wage dif-
 ferentials are small, relative to r, or the
 length of the plan is short), then e(t) 0
 and private decisions will again be socially
 optimal. However, if 0" < 0, and u*(t) > 0
 for some t, then (6) and (7') no longer
 coincide. The congestion or externality-
 causes private decisions to be socially sub-
 optimal. Comparing (6) and (7') we see
 that, starting from the same initial alloca-
 tion of labor, the initial unemployment rate
 under private actions u"(t) will exceed u*(t),
 as stated by Cassing-Ochs. Clearly, the
 initial private unemployment rate is higher
 because private decision makers ignore the
 congestion caused by additional entries into
 the pool of searchers; the optimal plan
 properly recognizes these congestion costs.
 However, this does not imply that private
 decisions lead to unemployment rates that
 are everywhere higher than for the optimal
 path. The higher initial u"(t) implies that at
 any future time, more workers will be em-
 ployed in C under the private solution than
 under the socially optimal plan (Lg(t) >
 L*(t)). Moreover, since the decision rule
 for terminating search-or labor transfers-
 is the same for private decisions and
 socially optimal ones; and since the ter-
 minal period of full employment increases as
 Lc increases, it immediately follows that full
 employment is restored sooner under private
 actions than under the socially optimal plan.
 Consequently, with congestion, the initial
 private unemployment rate is higher than is
 socially optimal, but ultimately it falls below
 the unemployment rate along the optimum
 path.5 Full employment is achieved sooner
 under private actions, more labor is trans-
 ferred to the higher wage sector, and na-
 tional income during the latter stages of
 the plan- is larger under private actions. Of
 course, the discounted value of national in-
 come over the whole plan is less under pri-
 vate actions.
 The principal point raised by Cassing-
 Ochs, I believe, is that even if factor prices
 are not rigid, private actions will not be
 socially optimal if congestion occurs in the
 search process. This point with which I
 completely agree follows directly from the
 externality generated by too many people
 searching for jobs at any one time. Private
 decisions will be socially optimal if: (i) no
 congestion occurs; (ii) individuals have per-
 fect foresight; (iii) the private and social
 planning horizons and discount rates are
 equal; and (iv) wages adjust instantaneously.
 Should any of these conditions fail to hold,
 then some intervention is required to sup-
 port the socially optimal plan.
 4This assumes no search is necessary in M-workers,
 having been employed there, know where to look for
 work. For symmetry, one should assume it is necessary
 to search for jobs in M as well as C; this, in turn would
 discourage initial quits. However, neither my original
 paper-nor the Cassing-Ochs specification--in-
 corporates this assumption.
 5Of course, if an optimal plan were instituted at any
 future moment, given the labor allocation provided by
 private decisions, then the socially optimal unemploy-
 ment rate would be lower. However, it makes more
 sense to contrast the time path generated by private
 decisions to that generated by a plan that is optimal
 over the whole planning period.
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